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TORT LAW-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-AcCRUAL OF MEDI
CAL MALPRACTICE ACTION-United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. III
(1979).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The date when a tort action "accrues," thereby triggering the
running of the statute of limitations, historically has been contested.
The importance of the accrual date is that the running of the statute
of limitations effectively precludes recovery for an otherwise valid
claim. The United States Supreme Court recently has provided ex
press guidelines for determining when a medical malpractice claim
against the federal government will accrue.
In United States v. Kubrick, 1 Justice White, writing for a six-to
three majority, reversed the Third Circuit which affirmed a Penn
sylvania district court decision regarding accrual of a medical mal
'practice claim against the federal government. The Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations2 for actions brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FT~A)3 barred recovery for a patient
treated at a Veterans Administration Hospital (VA Hospital). The
patient knew that the treatment he received had caused his deafness,
but did not suspect, until twenty-nine months later, that he had re
ceived negligently performed medical treatment. 4
On Apri12, 1968, William Kubrick, a Korean War veteran, was
admitted to the Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania VA Hospital for treat
~ent of osteomyelitisS of the right femur. After surgery, the infec
tious area was irrigated for thirteen days with a highly effective
1. 444 u.s. III (1979).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 240I(b) (1976).
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after
such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by
the agency to which it was presented.

Id.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). ''The United States shall be liable, respecting the pro
visions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances but shall not be liable for interest prior to
judgement or for punitive damages. . ..n Id.
4. 444 U.S. at 118-22.
S. Osteomyelitis is an "[iJnftamation of a bone and its marrow, caused by infection
ISS
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antibiotic, neomycin. The drug was but one of many antibiotics that
could have been used for such treatment. Unfortunately, the large
doses of neomycin, which eliminated the infection in his leg, caused
tinnitus6 accompanied by a partial hearing loss. 7 This condition
manifested itself in mid-June, about six weeks after Kubrick's dis
charge from the hospital. 8
Kubrick was later examined by a host of doctors for his hearing
problem. 9 In January 1969, Kubrick was informed that it was possi
ble that the neomycin treatment administered by the VA Hospital
was the cause of his hearing impairment. to Believing that his hear
ing impairment was the result of an unavoidable risk associated with
the neomycin irrigation treatment and not suspicious of any possibil
ity of malpractice~ Kubrick continued correctional treatment for his
hearing. I I
It was not until June 2, 1971 that Kubrick was informed by one
of his doctors that the neomycin should not have been administered
in 1968}2 This was the first time that anyone had suggested to
Kubrick that negligence may have been involved. Kubrick thereaf
ter brought a medical malpractice suit against the government under
the FTCA.
The district court awarded damages to Kubrick for the VA Hos
pital's negligence in using the neomycin. The court rejected the gov
ernment's argument that the suit was barred by the expiration of the
limitations period. The court held that the statute began to run not
when Kubrick became aware of the adverse injury and its cause but
when Kubrick "had reason at least to suspect that a legal duty to him
had been breached."13 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the
with bacteria or other microorganisms." J. SCHMIDT, ATIORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER 0-56 (1981).
6. Tinnitis is "[a) ringing, hissing, roaring, or buzzing sound heard by a patient
although no sound is actually being produced; i.e., a subjective sensation ofsound in the
ears." Id at T-75.
7. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 170-72 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid inpart,
remantJ.ed in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. JlI (1979).
8. 444 U.S. at 113.
9. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid in parI,
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. III (1979).
10. 444 U.S. at 114.
II. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid in parI,
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. JlI (1979). There was
considerable evidence, however, that would support the view that Kubrick did suspect
negligence. Id at 173.
12. Id at 173.
13. Id at 185.
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statute does not run when the plaintiff can prove that "in the exercise
of due diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts
which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that
the treatment was improper. . . ."14
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in
January 1969, Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable
cause and therefore, at that point, his claim accrued under the
FTCAls The Court stated that the purpose of the limitations period
is for claimants to determine if they have a viable cause of action
and, consequently, whether they should bring suit,16
This note will trace the developmental setting of the "accrual"
issue in part II with an examination of the policies supporting stat
utes of limitations. Parts III and IV will analyze Kubrick and the
issue will be compared with the manner in which state jurisdictions
have resolved the problem. Finally, the practical impact of Kubrick
will be discussed in part V of this note.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

To appreciate the essence of Kubrick, a basic understanding of
the underlying policies and objectives of statutes of limitations is
necessary. Statutes of limitations -rest on principles of sound public
policy by "requiring parties to settle their business matters within
certain reasonable periods."17 Therefore, they promote the peace
and welfare of society by not allowing affairs to "long remain uncer
tain."18 Statutes of limitations are characteristically statutes of re
pose based upon the proposition that persons who "sleep upon their
right" to bring a cause of action may lose that right after a specified
period of time. 19 The obvious effect of placing a limitation on an
action is that it effectively deprives one party of the opportunity, af
ter a time, to pursue an otherwise valid claim. 20 The primary argu
ment in favor of statutes of limitations is that of fairness to the
defendant,21 ''There comes a time when ... [a defendant] ought to
14. Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
III (1979).
15. 444 U.S. at 118-23.
16. Id at 124.
17. H. WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTION 8 (2d ed. 1893).
18. H. BUSWELL, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION 7 (1889).
19. See Order ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944).

20. Developments In The Law--StalUtes of Limitations, 63
of Limitationsj.

1185 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Statutes
21. Id

HARV.

L. REv. 1l77,
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be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped
clean of ancient obligations."22 Statutes of limitations are designed
to "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."23 They
also relieve the court of the burden of adjudicating stale claims.24
The common law imposed no limit on the time in which an ac
tion had to be brought. 2s Therefore, any limitation placed on an
action is the result of statutory enactment. 26 While the interests of
the defendant dictate that he be free from defending against stale
claims, the plaintiffs right to have reasonable access to the courts to
litigate meritorious claims must also be protected. In enacting stat
utes of limitations, therefore, legislatures must strike a balance be
tween the plaintiffs right to litigate meritorious claims and the
defendant's right to be free from defending against stale claims.27
Statutes of limitations usually begin to run when a cause of ac
tion accrues. 28 A cause of action is said to accrue when a successful
suit can be maintained. 29 The general rule for personal actions is
that a claim accrues when the tortious act or omission is commit
ted. 30 Under these circumstances, the tortious act itself is regarded
as the ground for the action and all damages resulting from the act
.
need not be sustained at that time. 31
Against the background of the act or omission rule emerged the
tort of medical negligence. Because of the nature of medical negli
gence,32 the harm resulting from the tortious act or omission of a
22. Id
23. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944).
24. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
25. H. WOOD, supra note 17, at 4.
26. Id
27. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 665-66, 453 P.2d 631, 635 (1969).
28. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 20, at 1200.
29. Id
30. Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 384, 16 A.2d 833, 835 (1940); Cristiani v.
City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1953).
31. Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 319, 30 P. 545, 546 (1892); Sonbergh v. Mac
Quarrie, 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 773, 247 P.2d 133, 135 (1952); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145,
155,162 N.W. 217, 220 (1917); Brown v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 138,
83 S.W.2d 568, 577 (1935).
32.
One group of cases in which there has been extensive departure from
the earlier rule iliat the statute of limitations runs although the plaintiff has no
knowledge of the injury has involved actions for mediCal malpractice. Two
reasons can be su~ested as to why there has been a change in the rule in many
jurisdictions in t1ili area. One is the fact that in most instances the statutory
period within which the action must be initiated is short- one year, or at most
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doctor may not manifest itself or become noticed by the plaintiff un
til after the normal limitations period has expired. Courts recog
nized the harshness of the general rule and the hardship it placed
upon the plaintiff when the delay in filing a claim was due to igno
rance of the cause of action, not from a plaintiff willfully sleeping on
his rights. 33 After being faced with situations in which foreign ob
jects remained inside a patient following surgery, courts were willing
to apply a "discovery rule" for determining the date of accrual for
medical malpractice actions. 34 A "discovery rule" was applicable
because these cases did not raise the problems that the statute of
limitations was originally designed to guard against, such as fraudu
lent claims or difficulty of proof after the passage of time. 35 The
"discovery rule" generally states that limitations do not begin to run,
that is, actions do not accrue, until the plaintiff knows, or with rea
sonable diligence should know, of the injury and its cause. 36 Implicit
in the adoption of the discovery rule for medical malpractice cases
was the courts' willingness to place a premium on the right of the
injured plaintiff to have adequate notice of an injury and subse
quently bring suit. This was done, however, at the expense of the
policy supporting the prevention of litigating stale claims.
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thomp
37
son adopted the discovery rule for determining when a cause of
action accrues under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. 38 Re
jecting the government's argument that the act or omission rule gov
erns the time when a cause of action accrues, the Court stated:
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such conse
quences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those
two, bein~ the common time limit. This is for the purpose of protecting physi
cians agamst unjustified claims; but since many of the consequences of medical
malpractice often do not become known or apparent for a period longer than
that of the statute, the injured plaintiff is left without a remedy. The second
reason is that the nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will
frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to
.
rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, Comment eat 444 (1979).
33. Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REv. 825, 839
(1974).
34. See note 68 infra.
35. Note, ProfeSSional Maipractice-StalUte ofLimitation-Cause ofAction Accrues
in Professional Malpractice Tort Claim from the Date the Alleged Injury is Discovered
Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d 129,
334 N.E.2d 160 (1975), 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 568, 571 (1976).
36. See cases cited note 43 infra.
37. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
38. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
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consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion
of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the inva
sion of legal rigkts. 39

In 1962 the Fifth Circuit, borrowing the blameless ignorance
notion from Urie, adopted the discovery rule for medical malprac
tice suits brought against the federal government under the FTCA.40
In Quinton v. United States,41 the court held that a claim accrues
when ''the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable dili
gence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged
malpractice. "42
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

The unique aspect of Kubrick is the manner in which each fac
tor associated with the accrual of an action under the discovery rule
can stand alone without reasonably drawing suspicion to the other
factors. These factors are knowledge, or reasonable suspicion, of:
The injury; its cause; and that a breach of legal duty may have oc
curred. If A punched B, for example, it would be reasonable to as
sume that at the time B was punched he knew or suspected: That he
was injured; the cause of the injury; and that he may have a legal
claim against A. All three factors emerged simultaneously. If, in
stead, A poisoned B, B may know he felt uncomfortable but may not
know the cause. Once B discovered the cause it would be reasonable
to assume that B should at least suspect that he had a legal claim
against A. This pattern is usually consistent with situations in which
foreign objects remained in a patient following surgery.
The problem is that breach of a legal duty was normally in
ferred from the discovery of an injury and its cause. 43 When
39. 337 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
40. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
41. 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
42. Id at 240. In 1956, plaintiffs wife was admitted to Larson Air Force Base
Hospital and given three transfusions of the wrong blood type. The wife did not learn of,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have discovered, this error until her
pregnancy in 1959. She gave birth to a stillborn child and subsequently brought suit. Id
at 235. The court rejected the government's argument that the cause of action accrued at
the time of the transfusion. Id at 240-41.
43. Although most cases discuss discovery of the "acts of malpractice," they specif
ically make findings of the time at which the plaintiff should have discovered the injury
or its cause, thereby assuming that a breach of legal duty would naturally follow. See
Zeidler v. United States, 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979) (hearing granted to determine
when plaintiff should have discovered his injury and its cause); Exnicious v. United
States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff told that soreness after shoulder surgery
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Kubrick discovered his injury, tinnitus, the cause could not be rea
sonably suspected and, when the cause became known, Kubrick ar
gued that negligence could not be reasonably suspected. 44 That is,
recognition or awareness of one factor could not reasonably alert
Kubrick to suspect another factor. The application of the rationale
of previous cases, particularly Quinton, to the facts of Kubrick
presents difficulties arising primarily from the use of imprecise lan
guage. Is "discovery of the malpractice" discovery of the injury, its
cause, breach ofa legal duty, or a particular combination of some or
all of these factors?
In the majority of medical malpractice cases, discovery of the
injury and its cause is all that is required to trigger the running of the
statute of limitations because breach of a legal duty naturally can be
inferred. 45 In only one federal case has the Kubrick-type fact pattern
been litigated under the FTCA. In Jordan v. United States,46 plain
tiff suffered from chronic sinusitis and underwent nose surgery in the
hope of alleviating his sinus condition. After the operation, compli
cations arose in his left eye. Doctors, in response to his questions,
told plaintiff that the eye problems were the result of muscle damage
caused by the procedures required to deal with the unanticipated se
verity of his sinus condition.47 In 1971, three years after the surgery,
a doctor told plaintiff there was nothing more he could do for the eye
and that it was ''too bad they screwed up your eye when they oper
ated on your nose. "48 Plaintiff brought suit under the FTCA. The
government claimed that the statute of limitations had run because
plaintiff had been aware of his injury and its cause for more than two
years. The Sixth Circuit found that the evidence failed to show that
plaintiff "should have been aware that the muscle damage may have
was due to traumatic arthritis, when actual cause was aseptic necrosis); Bridgeford v.
United States, 550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between
femoral vein severed during operation and later complications); Portis v. United States,
483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between improper admin
istration of neomycin and her resulting deafness); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d
257 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff told cause of paraplegia was arteriovenus angioma, when
actual cause was epidural hematoma); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971)
(plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between pantopaque retention from myelogram and
subsequent brain damage); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d at 234 (plaintiffs wife
unaware of her injury).
44. See cases cited note 60 infra.
45. 444 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974).
47. Id at 621.
48. Id.
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been the result of ... improper performance. . . ."49 The Jordan
court stated:
Affirmance of the district court's decision under these circum
stances would perpetrate an injustice similar to the one sought to
be corrected by the adoption of the so-called "discovery" rule in
the federal and state courts since appellant's claim would be
barred prior to the time when he had any reasonable cause to be
lieve that the acts which caused his injury were wrongful. 50

The reasoning in Jordan is consistent with the blameless ignorance
concept introduced in Urie.
The district court in Kubrick reasoned that, because of the tech
nical complexity of the case, a person exercising reasonable diligence
would not have been alerted to the possibility that he may have been
legally wronged. 51 Though there was an awareness of the injury and
its cause, the court stated there is a rebuttable presumption that
knowledge of the injury and its cause will alert a reasonable person
to suspect that he may have been the victim of negligence. 52 Finding
that Kubrick exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim,
the court stated that it did not believe it reasonable to start the stat
ute running until plaintiff at least had reason to suspect that a legal
duty to him had been breached. 53 The court's reasoning brought the
blameless ignorance notion to its logical conclusion.
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court insisted that
knowledge of the injury and its cause invokes an irrebutable pre
sumption of invasion of legal rightS. 54 The Court stated that once a
plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause all he need do is make
inquiries into whether he may be the victim of negligence. 55 The
Court's holding appears to be based generally on two factors: Con
gressional intent and stale claims litigation.
, The Court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the language or the
legislative history of the. . . [FTCA] that provides a substantial ba
sis for the Court of Appeals' construction of the accrual language of
. [section] 2401(b)."56 This is correct; but, at the same time, there
49. Id. at 624.
50. Id.
51. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aJl'd in parI,
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), reJl'd, 444 U.S. III (1979).
52. Id. at 182.
53. Id. at 185-86.
54. 444 U.S. at 122-24.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 119.
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is no indication of congressional intent that would support the
Supreme Court's construction of the accrual language. 57 The
Court's construction of congressional intent was premised upon the
general proposition that Congress intended the prompt presentation
of claims by setting a two-year limitations period. 58 As the dissent
pointed out, however, appellate courts have consistently applied the
discovery rule for decades without any indication of congressional
hostility. 59
The Court's fear of litigating stale claims is not unfounded; but,
unless the Court is prepared to denounce the discovery rule entirely
and insist upon instituting an act or omission rule, the possibility of
litigating stale claims always is present. It appears that courts that
have adopted the discovery rule have accepted the possible conse
quence of litigation of stale claims in return for the equitable treat
ment of the medical negligence victim. Whether the Supreme
Court's fine tuning of the discovery rule in Kubrick actually will re
duce the number of stale claims that would have been presented is a
provocative question. The answer may lie in the realization that
there have been only two cases presented in federal court over the
past twenty years that have raised this question, Jordan and Kubrick.
Also, in the vast majority of cases, negligence should be suspected. 60
In the few remaining cases, innocent or intentional misrepresenta
tion could be alleged which would also have the effect of tolling the
limitations period. 61 Overall, the Court's decision will probably
57. The Court essentially admitted that nothing instructive can be inferred from
the legislative history. Id at 119 n.6.
58. Id at 117.
59. Id at 127. See also notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339 (lOth Cir. 1976) (plaintiff rea
sonably should have suspected negligence when after an injection injured a sciatic nerve,
he was aware that resulting paralysis in left leg was caused by injection); Reilly v. United
States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975) (where doctor originally stated hoarse condition
would quickly heal after endotracheal intubation, plaintiff reasonably should have sus
pected negligence after discovery that tracheal stenosis had developed); Ciccarone v.
United States, 486 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff reasonably should have suspected
negligence when a deterioration in health was immediately apparent after injection of
blue dye in plaintiJrs spinal column to determine cause of recurrent meningitis attacks);
Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965) (court found there was knowledge
of sufficient facts to alert a reasonable person that there may have been negligence when
parents knew that their premature child's blindness was caused by administration of ex
cessive oxygen).
61. Innocent or intentional misrepresentation as a defense to the running of the
statute of limitations has yet to be asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but has
been readily accepted under other federal acts. See, e.g., Holifield v. Cities Servo Tanker
Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. La. 1976) (unawareness of full extent of injury by plantitf
in a case arising under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), does not necessarily consti
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have little impact upon reducing the number of stale claims that may
be brought.
IV.

COMPARISON WITH STATE DECISIONS

The same equitable principles that encouraged adoption of the
discovery rule for medical negligence cases in federal courts also en
couraged adoption of the discovery rule in state courts. A review of
how state courts have handled the posited issue is enlightening.
Only a limited number of jurisdictions have had the opportunity to
litigate this specific issue. 62 Until approximately seven years ago, the
state legislatures were content to permit the courts to exercise a free
hand in determining when causes of action would accrue. With the
recent modification of many state statutes of limitations for medical
malpractice, it appears that few states will have the opportunity to
litigate the Kubrick issue. In assessing the reason for the modifica
tion of many state statutes of limitations it may be concluded that
the equitable principles of justice and fairness, which served as the
foundation for the adoption of the discovery rule, have been seri
ously assaulted in the past six years by the realities of business
economics.
When insurance companies intimated that medical malpractice
was becoming an uninsurable risk,63 state legislatures were quick to
intervene and enact comprehensive medical malpractice legislation
that involved, among other things, modifying the statute of limita
tions for medical malpractice actions. 64 The problem is stated in
Utah's legislative findings set out in its Medical Malpractice Act:
tute innocent or intentional misrepresentation by doctor when true extent of injury not
determined until surgery); Mumpower v. Southern Ry. Co., 270 F. Supp. 318 (W.O. Va.
1967) (innocent misrepresentation held a valid defense in a case arising under the Fed
eral Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976), when doctor informed plainti1f he
suffered no injuries when, in fact, plaintiff had ruptured disc that required surgery).
62. See generally Leary v. Rupp, 89 Mich. App. 145,280 N.W.2d 466 (1979); AI
fone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (1976); Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92
Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
63. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACfICE:
REpORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACflCE (1973); Redish, Leg
is/alive Response to tile Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutiona/lmp/ications,
55 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1977); Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations as Special
Legislation, Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 60 m. App. 3d 285, 377 N.E.2d 290
(1978), 55 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 519 (1979). Some authorities dispute the existence of a
medical malpractice crisis. See Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-TIre Illusory Crisis,
54 FLA. BJ. 114 (1980); Fuchberg, Mytits of Medical Malpractice, 11 TRIAL L.Q. 49
(1976).
64. See note 67 infra.
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The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and
claims for damages. . . from health care has increased greatly in
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has
substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice
insurance....
In view of these recent trends, . . . it is necessary to protect the
public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage pri
vate insurance companies to continue to provide health-related
malpractice insurance. . . .
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against
health care providers while limiting that time to a spectfic period
for which professional liability insurance premiums can be rea
sonably and accurately calculated....65
Legislative limiting of the amount of time within which a medi
cal malpractice claim may be brought to within a specific period
from the date of the negligent act illustrates that the policy of at
tempting to compensate all victims of medical negligence through
the judicial adoption of the discovery rule clearly has yielded to eco
nomic realities. This does not reduce the viability of continued in
quiry, however, because the discovery rule still survives within the
confines of the act or omission rule. An example of this type of hy
brid discovery rule has been adopted in North Dakota and states:
The following actions must be commenced within two years after
the cause of action has accrued:
3. An action. for the recovery of damages resulting from mal
practice, provided, however, that the limitation of an action
against a physician or licensed hospital will not be extended be
yond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice by a
nondiscovery thereof....66
Twenty-four jurisdictions67 have adopted this hybrid limitations
65. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-2 (1976) (emphasis added).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1977).
67. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975); CAL. [CIV. hOC.] CODE § 340.5 (West Cum.
Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Cum. Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-584 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18. § 6856 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95. 11(4)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 657-7.3
(Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CoDE ANN.
§ 614.1(9) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6O-513(7)(c) (1976); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 413.140(2) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628
(West Supp. 1981); MD. [CTs. & JUD. hoc.] CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1980); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 41A.097 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West Cum. Supp.
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statute, while twelve jurisdictions68 retain the unadulterated discov
ery rule.
Relatively few jurisdictions have litigated the issue posited in
Kubrick .69 Because many of the new hybrid statutes specifically
state that a claim accrues when a claimant reasonably should have
discovered his injury, the issue will be moot in these jurisdictions.
The imprecise language employed in pre-Kubrick federal cases has
plagued the few courts that have touched upon the issue of accruapo
Courts that have litigated the correctly articulated issue generally
have chosen to follow the rationale of the Kubrick district court. The
Washington Supreme Court and appellate courts in Michigan and
New Jersey are three such examples.
In Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital,7} the Washington
Supreme Court held that appellant's claim "did not accrue until she
discovered all the essential elements of her possible cause of action,
i.e., duty, breach, causation, damages."72 In Michigan the court of
appeals held that for an action to accrue, a person must discover "the

o

1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1979); S.C. CODE § 15-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Supp.
1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.350 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
68. See Bums v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979); Franklin v. Albert., 1980 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 2187,411 N.E.2d 458; Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973);
Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125,417 P.2d 469 (1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174
Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320
A.2d 637 (1974); Femandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Ayers v. Morgan,
397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745
(1968); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149
W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-107 (1977).
69. See notes 71-74 infra and accompanying text.
70. In Florida, notice of "invasion of legal rights" has been construed to mean
notice of the "cause." Tetstone v. Adams; 373 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court ardently supported plaintiffs position
that an action should not accrue until plaintiff suspected "negligence," a reading of the
facts of the case indicates that it was actually the "cause" of the injury that was not
suspected by plaintiff. Browti. v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 744,
378 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1977).
71. 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
72. Id at 511,598 P.2d at 1360. Plaintiffwas born prematurely and placed in an
incubator. She was administered ''too much oxygen" which caused her loss of sight.
Plaintiff knew that her blindness was caused from too much oxygen but always believed
that the oxygen had been administered properly and was necessary for her treatment as a
premature baby. Id at 508-09, 598 P.2d at 1359. The court found it was a question of
fact whether plaintiff knew or should have known that the result was a breach of the
hospital's duty. Id at 51D-ll, 598 P.2d at 1360. But see Brown v. United States, 353 F.ld
578 (9th Cir. 1965); Itenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 73 m. App. 3d 694, 392
N.E.2d 440 (1979).
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act or omission itself, . . . and have a good reason to believe the act
itself was improper. . . ."73 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appel
late Division, stated that for triggering the start of the statute of limi
tations the patient needed to discover that the injury ''was related to
fault on the part of the physician as distinguished from mere knowl
edge of a causal relationship . . . between the doctor's acts and the
injury."74 These are essentially the only cases that have differenti
ated between the time of the discovery of the injury, its cause, and
suspicion of negligence.
Other jurisdictions have litigated cases that essentially parallel
Kubrick-type fact patterns, but the courts have failed to recognize
the issue in Kubrick-like terms. Appellate courts in the District of
Columbia and Texas have held that it is a question for the trier of
fact to determine when a claimant should have discovered his in
jury.7S In those cases, however, the physical injury and its cause
were always mown by the claimants. Based on a reading of the
facts, the courts actually implied that the limitations period starts,
not when the claimant discovers the injury, but when the claimant
should have suspected that the physician's conduct was negligent.
73. Leary v. Rupp, 89 Mich. App. 145, 149, 280 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1979). The
patient developed an allergic reaction from the drugs prescribed by defendant. The pa
tient knew the allergic reaction was caused by the drugs. The court stated that ''while the
plaintiff knew of some of the acts, i.e., the prescribing of polycillin and prednisone, and
the resulting harm, allergic reaction and pain in the legs, reasonable minds could differ as
to when she should have realized that the doctor had acted improperly." Id at 149-50,
280 N.W.2d at 468.
74. Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 520, 354 A.2d 654,655 (1976).
75. Plaintiff, in Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979), received a facelift opera
tion from defendant. After surgery, in August 1968, plaintiff noticed what she called
"gross scars" and also experienced numbness around the surgical area. Defendant indi
cated that these conditions would improve with time, and later assured plaintiff that she
was progressing satisfactorily. Id at 614-15. Plaintiff, in 1974, recommended defendant
to one of her friends and after seeing the results of her friend's surgery, concluded that
she had not healed properly. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit in 1977. Id at 615. The
court of appeals remanded for a determination of when plaintiff should have reasonably
discovered her injury. Id at 617-18.
The appellate court in Texas similarly held that the question of when plaintiff
should have discovered her injury is a factual inquiry. Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe, 553
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Defendant operated oil plaintiff to alleviate a sinus
condition and to remove a small bump from her nose. Her nose swelled and the bump
remained. After defendant's assurances that plaintifl's nose would improve, plaintiff un
derwent a second operation to correct the bump. Plaintiff then had a dip in her nose
instead of a bump, and again her doctor assured her that her nose would improve. In
1975, another physician advised plaintiff that her nose had been "messed up," where
upon plaintiff filed suit. Id at 193-94.
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PRACTICAL EFFECT AND CONSIDERATIONS

The patent effect of Kubrick is that it overrules the holding in
Jordan. It also overrules a line of dictum used in federal cases since
Urie stating that a malpractice action accrues when the plaintiff sus
pects the invasion of his legal rightS. 76
The latent effect of the decision is more devastating. In an at
tempt to bar a very limited number of medical malpractice claims
from being litigated in federal court, the Supreme Court has, in ef
fect, created, in every government hospital,77 a nonlegal presumption
of negligence for every unsuccessful treatment or unforeseeable re
sult regardless of how innocent the action may have been. In a med
ical community that is already bitter over the jurisprudential
intervention into its profession,78 Kubrick will place further strain on
those sentiments by requiring patients to investigate and scrutinize
unsuccessful results of their treatment. Under similar circumstances,
Judge Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
majority's position in this regard assumes a consciousness of poten
tiallitigation that is unrealistic even in the litigious society we live in
today and will, on pain of forfeiture, force persons to act with exces
sive caution to safeguard their legal rightS."79
The corollary to these latent effects is just as significant. The
economic strains on the patient of retaining an attorney, consulting
medical experts, and possibly employing discovery procedures, only
to be advised that one's treatment was proper, is unjust and unrea
sonable. In view of the' established "conspiracy of silence" in the
medical profession, the Supreme Court's assertion that the patient
needs merely to consult another physician is rather tenuous. 80 In
addition, it would be a spurious assumption to reasonably expect a
patient to consult with another physician when the patient does not
suspect any wrongdoing. Likewise, it would be equally unjust to im
76. See notes 43 & 60 supra.
77. ''The VA operates the largest hospital system in the nation. Included in its
program are about 170 separate hospitals, with almost 100,000 beds, in which about I
million patients each year receive treatment." D. AOOLESTONE, S. HEWMAN & F.
GROSS, THE RIGHTS OF VETERANS 193 (1978).
78. See Cohn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A Plague on Doth Houses, 52
A.B.A.I. 32 (1966); Dean, A Physician's View, 49 FLA. B.I. 504 (1975); Demy, Practice
and Malpractice (One Doctor's Viewpoint), 19 MEO. TRIAL TECH. Q. 61 (1973); Powers,
Interprofessional Education and The Reduction of Medico-Legal Tensions, 17 1. LEGAL
Eouc. 167 (1964).
79. Burd v. New Iersey Tel. Co., 76 N.I. 284, 298-99, 386 A.2d 1310, 1318 (1978)
(products liability action).
80. 444 U.S. at 128-29 n.4 (Stevens, 1., dissenting).
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pute constructive knowledge of the effect of Kubrick upon all who
enter a government hospital.
Yet, to maintain a perspective on how Kubrick and the issue of
accrual should be resolved, it must be remembered that state courts
were first to recognize the inherent inequities in applying the act or
omission rule to medical negligence cases and, consequently,
adopted the discovery rule. Federal courts followed suit. The lag
can be attributed to the nonexistence of medical negligence claims
against the government until the legislative waiver of government
tort immunity through the enactment of the FTCA. Federal case
law has, since then, progressed far beyond that of many states.
There are some state courts, however, that have resolved the Kubrick
issue. Federal courts have failed to take cognizance of these deci
sions. Nevertheless, while the federal courts have been oblivious to
the state court decisions since the adoption of the discovery rule in
Quinton, the equities that spurred both the state and federal courts to
adopt the discovery rule are now being compromised in the state
legislatures because of the economic realities of the insurance crisis.
State legislators realized that an attempt to compensate all who have
been injured could have resulted in.no one being compensated.
The conception that insurance companies have huge reserves of
money to compensate those who are injured must go by the wayside.
The same misconception might be attributed to the federal govern
ment: The same concerns that affected the state legislatures may also
affect the federal government. Justice Holmes stated, "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."81 Perhaps the
equitable principles that encouraged abandonment of the logical act
or omission rule must now, in light of economic realities, act to re
strain the equitable logic of the discovery rule. If this is the case,
perhaps there should be constraints on the presently unencumbered
discovery rule as it exists within the FTCA. An adjustment that
would act to create a hybrid discovery82 rule is within the proper
scope of the legislature. The unintentional, negligible effort by the
Supreme Court to limit the discovery rule eventually will do more
harm than good.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Statutes of limitations essentially are statutes of repose. Their
original purpose was to protect the defendant from having to defend
81. O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
82. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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himself against stale and sometimes fraudulent claims. Simultane
ously, however, statutes of limitations might also preclude what
otherwise may be a valid claim. Originally, an action would aCcrue
at the time of the tortious act or omission. This standard caused
great injustices in cases of medical malpractice. Recognizing the
harshness of the general rule, courts displayed a willingness to place
a premium on the rights of the plaintiff by adoptmg a discovery rule.
The discovery rule has been used for over eighteen years to deter
mine when a medical malpractice claim accrues under the FTCA,
without congressional complaint. Despite this silence, the United
States Supreme Court found that the prompt presentation of claims
is of paramount interest to the legislature and consequently held that
a patient's claim had accrued before the time that he became aware
that a legal duty owed to him had been breached. The arguments
used by the Court are tenuous .. Even in light of the recent trend to
reduce the number of medical malpractice claims, the adverse effects
associated with the Supreme Court's limiting of the discovery rule
cannot be justified. If there is a desire or need to cut back on the
number of medical malpractice claims under the FTCA, particularly
stale claims, Congress is in the proper position to take action. Enact
ment of a hybrid discovery rule as that adopted by North Dakota
and twenty-three other jurisdictions appears to be the most equitable
solution.
Robert Muscara

